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Abstract. In the early age of the internet users enjoyed a large level 
of anonymity. At the time web pages were just hypertext documents; 
almost no personalisation of the user experience was oﬀered. The Web 
today has evolved as a world wide distributed system following speciﬁc 
architectural paradigms. On the web now, an enormous quantity of user 
generated data is shared and consumed by a network of applications 
and services, reasoning upon users expressed preferences and their social 
and physical connections. Advertising networks follow users’ browsing 
habits while they surf the web, continuously collecting their traces and 
surﬁng patterns. We analyse how users tracking happens on the web by 
measuring their online footprint and estimating how quickly advertising 
networks are able to proﬁle users by their browsing habits. 
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1 Introduction 
When users surf the web an intricate network of personalisation services tracks 
their preferences by following their browsing habits. These data is used to pro­
vide tailored suggestions, in terms of products users could buy, resources they 
might ﬁnd interesting, social connections they might be interest to form. Per­
sonalisation services sometimes rely on diﬀerent techniques to track users across 
diﬀerent websites and applications. Many of these techniques use cookies. For 
example, Google Analytics service [7] uses cookies to measure user-interactions 
on websites. Another set of these techniques uses web or app sessions left open 
by the user. As an example someone might decide to check their web email ac­
count and then continue to surf the web without signing out, therefore leaving 
their session open. Yet another set of these techniques uses personalised fea­
tures of the user’s device or browser to restrict the pool of possible candidates 
among their visitors. Features that might be used by advertising networks in­
clude personalised language or fonts settings, browser extensions and so on. By 
identifying user through their accounts or unique features, analytics technologies 
can distinguish unique users across multiple devices or sessions. 
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1.1 Contribution 
We have observed how users are tracked across the web and how the displayed 
advertising is tailored even after they have visited a few websites with a certain 
interest bias. In our study we analyse how quickly advertising networks can 
identify a user and start tracking them by measuring the distance between the 
measured user proﬁle and the advertising proﬁle. We introduce a set of metrics 
to express this distance and measure the number of web sites visited after which 
the distance between the advertising proﬁle and the user proﬁle is less then a 
certain threshold. 
It is important to know that we have consider the case for which users are not 
registering, neither connecting any external account, as it could be the case with 
services like: Facebook, Google+, Twitter, and so on. We shall also point out 
that we have concentrated our study onto a single advertising network: Google. 
We reserve to future studies the possibility to include and analyse also other 
networks. 
The main contributions of this paper are the following. 
1. Introducing a model of the user online footprint. 
2. Measuring how quickly a user is uniquely identiﬁed and tracked by an ad­
vertising network. 
3. Introducing a measure of similarity between the user proﬁle and the observed 
advertising proﬁle. 
2 Background 
Information regarding locations, browsing habits, communication records, health 
information, ﬁnancial information, and general preferences regarding user online 
and oﬄine activities are shared by diﬀerent parties online. This level of access 
is often directly granted from the user of such services. In a wide number of 
occasion though, private information are captured by online services without 
the direct user consent or even knowledge. We believe that the privacy and sen­
sitiveness of the information becoming accessible to third parties can be easily 
overlooked. 
Personal computers and more generally communication devices that are carried 
around by people are capable of being located, identiﬁed and tracked across 
diﬀerent locations, networks and services [8]. All these devices can therefore be 
used for a variety of surveillance activities, which are in itself detrimental to the 
user’s interests. Until recently in fact, the cost of surveillance and tracking of 
people and activities was proportional to the cost of directly reaching, asking or 
following a single person or a group of people. Technology therefore enhances 
the surveillance capabilities by introducing tools that allow the collection of in­
formation arising from a person’s activities. This information can furthermore 
be combined and inferred, therefore oﬀering a more complete picture of that 
person. 
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For example, to personalise their services or oﬀer tailored advertising, web ap­
plications could use tracking services that identify a user through diﬀerent net­
works [14] [5]. These tracking services usually combine information from diﬀerent 
proﬁles that users create, for example their Gmail address or their Facebook or 
LinkedIn accounts. In addition speciﬁc characteristics of the user’s device can 
be used to identify them through diﬀerent sessions and websites, as described 
by the Panopticlick project [4]. 
Browser ﬁngerprinting is a technique implemented by analytics services and 
tracking technologies to identify uniquely a user while they browser diﬀerent 
websites. Diﬀerent features of a speciﬁc browser setup can be used to identify 
uniquely a user. Supported languages, browser extensions or installed fonts [2] 
can be used to identify a browser setup among others. More advanced techniques 
distinguish between browsers’ JavaScript execution characteristics [9]. These fea­
tures are particularly interesting since they are more diﬃcult to simulate or mit­
igate in practice. Targeting JavaScript execution characteristics actually means 
looking at the innate performance signature of each browser’s JavaScript en­
gine, allowing the detection of browser version, operating system and microar­
chitecture. These attacks can also work in situations where traditional forms of 
system identiﬁcation (such as the user-agent header) are modiﬁed or hidden. 
Other techniques exploit the whitelist mechanism of the popular NoScript Fire­
fox extension.This mechanism allow the user to selectively enabling web pages’ 
scripting privileges to increase privacy by allowing a site to determine if partic­
ular domains exist in a user’s NoScript whitelist. 
It is important to note that while tracking creates serious privacy concerns for 
internet users, the customisation of results is also beneﬁcial to the end user [3]. 
In fact, while tailored services oﬀer to the user only information relevant to their 
interests, it also allows some companies and institutions to concentrate an enor­
mous amount of information about internet users in general. [12] investigate 
user proﬁling and access mechanisms oﬀered by online data aggregator to users’ 
collected data. Both the collected data and its accuracy was analysed together 
with the user’s concerns. In their ﬁndings about 70% of the participants to the 
study expressed some concerns about the collection of sensitive data, its level of 
detail and how it might be used by third parties, especially for credit and health 
information. 
It has been shown how most successful tracking networks exhibit a consistent 
structure across markets, with a dominant connected component that, on aver­
age, includes 92.8% of network vertices and 99.8% of the connecting edges [6]. [6] 
have measured the chance that a user will become tracked by all top 10 trackers 
in approximately 30 clicks on search results to be of 99.5%. More interesting, 
[6] have shown how tracking networks present properties of the small world net­
works. Therefore implying a high-level global and local eﬃciency in spreading 
the user information and delivering targeted ads. 
4 Lecture Notes in Computer Science: Authors’ Instructions 
3 Modelling the user’s footprint 
We model the user’s activity as series of events belonging to a certain identity. 
Each event is a document containing diﬀerent information. We can formally de­
ﬁned this as a hypermedia document i.e. an object possibly containing graphics, 
audio, video, plain text and hyperlinks. We call the hyperlinks selectors and 
we use these to build the connections between the user’s diﬀerent identities or 
events. Each identity is a proﬁle that the user has created onto a service or plat­
form. This can be an application account or a social network account, such as 
their LinkedIn or Facebook unique IDs. An event is an action performed by the 
user, like visiting a website or creating a post on a blog. 
We aggregate keywords each time the user creates a new event by visiting a dif­
ferent url. These keywords constitute the user proﬁle of interests (Figure 1). A 
tractable model of the user proﬁle as a probability mass function (PMF) is pro­
posed in [11, 10] to express how each keyword contributes to expose how many 
times the user has indirectly expressed a preference toward a speciﬁc category. 
We consider that the user expresses a preference when they visit a webpage cat­
egorised with a certain keywords. This model follows the intuitive assumption 
that a particular category is weighted according to the number of times this has 
been counted in the user proﬁle. 
We deﬁne the proﬁle of a user um as the PMF pm = (pm,1, . . . , pm,L), concep­
tually a histogram of relative frequencies of tags across the set of tag categories 
T . 
Similarly, we deﬁne the proﬁle of an ads in as the PMF qn = (qn,1, . . . , qn,L), 
where qn,l is the percentage of tags belonging to the category l which have been 
assigned to this speciﬁc advertising item. Both user and ads proﬁles can then be 
seen as normalised histograms of tags across categories of interest. Our proﬁle 
model is in this extent equivalent to the tag clouds that numerous collaborative 
tagging services use to visualise which tags are being posted, collaboratively or 
individually by each user. A tag cloud, similarly to a histogram, is a visual rep­
resentation in which tags are weighted according to their relevance. 
In view of the assumptions described in the previous section, our privacy attacker 
boils down to an entity that aims to proﬁle users by representing their interests 
in the form of normalised histograms, on the basis of a given categorisation. 
3.1 A metric of similarity 
We consider the third party advertising network to operate like a recommenda­
tion system, that suggest products or services that might be of interest for the 
user, based on their preferences. A recommendation system can be described as 
an information ﬁltering system that seeks to predict if the user is interested or 
not in a particular resource. We assume that the ad server suggest advertising 
based on a measure of similarity. 
We measure the user proﬁle, as previously described, as an histogram of their 
recorded preferences, and the advertising proﬁle as an histogram of the ads that 
� 
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Fig. 1: Here we show an example of user proﬁle expressed in absolute terms 
by counting the number of keywords in each category for a browsing session. 
We model user and advertising proﬁles as histograms of tags keywords a set of 
predeﬁned categories of interest. 
the user has received. We use the 1 − norm as a measurement of how the adver­
tising network is tracking the user proﬁle: 
�pm, qn�1 = pmi − qni 
i 
4 Experimental methodology and results 
We analysed the browsing habits of 86 users of Twitter, by observing the set of 
websites they share in their feed. We assumed that the articles shared on twitter 
are a subset of the website that each users visit every day. Yet if they are ac­
tive Twitter users, these websites will express their interest bias towards certain 
categories. Please note that we only consider the links shared on the platform 
as a sequence of website that the user might have visited. These sites are there­
fore surfed in our simulation environment. Here we pretend that a user is going 
through their reading list of sites and we measure how the advertising changes 
in the page and adapts to their proﬁle. The user is simulated by a software agent 
opening the urls and surﬁng the page for a certain arbitrary amount of time. 
In our simulated environment the users are not logged in Twitter or any other 
account. 
For each users we analysed the websites and collected keywords for the shared 
articles. We used both the meta information contained in the page, as well as 
extracted keywords from the actual text of the page by using the Rapid Auto­
matic Keyword Extraction (RAKE) [13] algorithm. Each keyword was evaluated 
against Open Directory Project (DMOZ) [1] for classiﬁcation within top levels 
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categories. 
Once the user proﬁle was calculated the advertising proﬁle is evaluated. The 
advertising proﬁle is extracted from url parameters contained in third party re­
quests. We have considered only Google ads for the purpose of this study. These 
parameters are again evaluated against DMOZ for classiﬁcation within top levels 
categories. 
At each step the linear norm between the advertising proﬁle and the actual user 
proﬁle is evaluated. 
By proﬁling users’ browsing events using a hypermedia document structure 
we were able to show how each event contains a set of features regarding the 
user identity and the page that was visited. We have therefore categorised each 
event by using the keywords contained in the meta information present in the 
page and the page text itself (Figure 1). We have observed how a large and 
sophisticated advertising network such as Google is able to proﬁle users quickly 
and only in a few visits (Figures 2 and 3) 
Fig. 2: The ﬁgure illustrates how the norm between the advertising and the 
browsing proﬁle decrease of approximately 20% in two subsequents visits and 
only in 15 seconds. 
We have found how our hypermedia model is particularly suited for big data 
analysis and how it allows a user to keep their online footprint under control 
by understanding precisely which websites have introduced certain keywords in 
their proﬁle. Eventually this technique would allow the user to implement more 
precise Privacy Enhancing Techniques (PETs) to masquerade their proﬁle to 
advertising networks. 
5 Conclusions and future work 
Using a hypermedia model to capture the footprint that users leave online while 
surﬁng the web has proven a promising technique. Particularly the model is able 
to capture both the single categorisation that each webpage introduce as well 
as time series analytics and breaking up of third party tracking per advertising 
7 Lecture Notes in Computer Science: Authors’ Instructions 
Fig. 3: The ﬁgure compare the 1-norm decrease for three diﬀerent users in a short 
timespan. This shows how, when a user surf websites in a speciﬁc category the 
advertising slowly adapts to the new category and the norm decreases. When 
the category changes the advertising needs to adjust again. 
network. We have also shown how web tracking by large advertising networks 
happens very quickly in a few subsequent visits to websites in the network (Fig­
ures 2 and 3). In future research we would like to further explore the hypermedia 
model introduced, while continuing to understand how quickly web advertising 
is able to match the served ads with the actual user proﬁle. This would allow 
us to understand if diﬀerent proﬁles for the same users can be somehow linked 
together within similar advertising networks. We are also particularly interested 
in measuring how social networks sharing buttons and/or commenting services, 
included on websites, are able to track users even when these have not signed 
in with their account. We reserve the study of their capabilities to future in­
vestigations. More over we want to enlarge the set of users analysed by testing 
on logs from a real world small computer network, while also introducing new 
metrics to our study. In particular we are already planning to consider: 2-norm, 
KL-Divergence between the advertising proﬁle and the observed user proﬁle, 
Fisher information. We also believe in the importance to provide users with sim­
ple visualisation tools able to show the user their online footprint and allowing 
them to take action to masquerade their interests proﬁle or simply block certain 
networks. 
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